Core Bond (Plus): What’s Under the Hood and When to Consider It

We think it’s time for investors to consider moving from a short-duration bias toward core (plus) bond portfolios. Valuations have become more attractive across fixed income, with all-in yields approaching compelling levels. We share our views on when and why.

Treasuries 

• We believe the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield will remain broadly range-bound, and investors should consider investing when yields are close to or above the upper end of that range (~4.75%).
• Recent history suggests that extending duration through core bond strategies at these yield levels has worked well (Exhibit 1).
• More broadly, higher starting yields have historically been a good predictor of higher forward returns (Exhibit 2).
• The risk is that yields could move higher, but we see that risk as relatively limited given that the market already prices in a meaningful degree of monetary policy tightening and risk premium. A meaningful move above the recent range would require fairly dramatic assumptions on both fronts.
• In short, we view the risk-reward as favorable over the coming months.
• A more hawkish-than-expected Federal Reserve (Fed) remains a risk, but we believe that realized hikes could, in fact, cause longer-duration bonds to catch a bid.
• For investors with lower risk tolerance, we continue to view short-duration bonds as very resilient. Our analysis shows that two-year Treasury yields would need to rise above 9% to post negative returns (assuming a one-year horizon).

Investment-Grade (IG) Credit

• The major story in credit markets lately has been investment-grade bond supply, driven in part by hyperscaler borrowing. More than US$1.3 trillion of IG issuance came to market through the first seven months of the year—well above historical norms (Exhibit 3).
• Our seasonality analysis suggests supply should slow in the second half of 2026. Based on the 2015–2025 period, average monthly IG issuance was around 30% lower in the second half of the year than in the first half.
• If this pattern holds, even partially, this should provide some relief at a time when credit spreads have widened from their tights and are back around their April 2026 levels, closer to what we view as fair value.
• The risk is that elevated debt issu-ance will not ease. For now, though, we see pockets of risk as isolated, not broad-based.

High-Yield

• We continue to view an all-in yield on high-yield bonds north of 7% as attractive.
• Spreads are no longer at their tights¹ but remain historically low. However, low duration and an improved credit profile make the asset class more resilient than many assume.
• Exhibit 4 illustrates a range of total return scenarios for high yield. It would take a significant adverse move in yields and spreads for returns to turn negative.
• We remain biased toward higher-rated issuers. Triple-C credit is more vulnerable and has underperformed this year—something we are moni-toring, but not yet a reason for concern about the broader high-yield market.

Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)

Fundamentals in the Agency MBS space remain solid. A key risk for Agency MBS investors—prepayment risk—remains contained. The bulk of US mortgage borrowers remain locked in sub-4% mortgage rates, while the current mortgage rate is closer to 6.7%. This keeps refinancing activity subdued, as the lower panel of Exhibit 5 shows, limiting refi-nancing-driven prepayment risk.

At the same time, the same exhibit shows that spreads, while below their 10-year mean, are off their tights, which the fundamental backdrop broadly supports.

Relatively high carry,² rather than spread compression, is likely to be the major driver of returns in the second half of the year.

On the demand side, government-sponsored enterprise (GSE)³ buying has provided an important source of demand as Fed holdings continue to run off, while banks are finding the sector more attractive amid higher yields.

The biggest risk we see is increasing rate volatility (for example, amid less forward guidance from the Fed), which could reduce the relative appeal of Agency MBS given investors’ effectively short position in the embedded prepayment option, the value of which increases with volatility.